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Wang William
Commentary
Reflections on Contract Law and Distributive Justice:
A Reply to Kronman
By WILLIAM K. S. WANG*
In the first part of a recent article in the Yale Law Journal, I Profes-
sor Anthony Kronman provocatively argues that consistency forces lib-
ertarians down a slippery slope to welfare state liberalism. 2 Kronman
contends: (1) libertarians allow rescission of coerced agreements, that
is, contracts executed only because of threat of violence;3 (2) coercion is
equivalent to unjustified "advantage-taking"; 4 (3) to ascertain which
"advantage-taking" to prohibit in exchanges, libertarians must accept
paretianism, a theory of distributive justice;5 (4) with regard to "advan-
tage-taking" in contracts, the use of physical coercion, deceit, wealth,
or talent are morally indistinguishable;6 and (5) because a libertarian
uses paretianism, a principle of distributive justice, to judge the validity
* Professor, Hastings College of the Law; Member, California Bar. B.A. 1967, Am-
herst College; J.D. 1971, Yale Law School. I am grateful to Professor Lawrence Alexander
for his invaluable assistance in writing this Commentary and for suggesting a reply in the
first place. Professor Alexander was a but-for cause of this Commentary.
1. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472, 472-97 (1980).
2. Overgeneralizing, libertarians contend that individuals have an absolute right to
the fruits of their labor, welfare state liberals deny the absoluteness of this right and support
some compulsive redistribution of wealth to the needy.
This reply does not discuss the second part of Kronman's article, which challenges the
standard liberal preference for taxation as a method of redistribution.
3. Kronman, supra note 1, at 477-78.
4. Id at 478-83.
Kronman uses the word "advantage-taking" in a nonpejorative fashion. See infra note
32 & accompanying text. To emphasize the neutral nature of the term "advantage-taking,"
this Commentary will always place quotation marks around the word "advantage-taking"
and usually place them around the word "victim."
5. Id at 483-88.
Paretianism has two versions. Under "individual paretianism" (IP), "advantage-tak-
ing" in a particular transaction is permitted only if the specific victim will benefit in the long
run from allowing that form of "advantage-taking."
Under "group paretianism" (GP), a type of "advantage-taking" is allowed when doing
so will increase the long-run welfare of most people who are taken advantage of in that
particular way. See infra notes 15-16 & accompanying text.
6, Kronman, supra note 1, at 491-94.
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of contracts, the libertarian must also accept contract rules designed to
redistribute wealth more fairly.7
Were Kronman correct, his argument would constitute a definitive
victory for liberalism over libertarianism. This Commentary identifies
fatally weak links in Kronman's reasoning. With such high stakes rid-
ing on the validity of Kronman's argument, the sole goal of this paper
is the demonstration of philosophical error; this reply does not analyze
the relative merits of libertarianism and liberalism.
Kronman's Argument
Libertarians Must Endorse Paretianism to Ascertain the Legitimacy of
"Advantage-taking"
In slightly more detail, Kronman's argument is as follows. The
libertarian theory of contract law is premised upon the belief, first, that
individuals have the right to make voluntary agreements for the ex-
change of their own property; and second, that if an agreement is co-
erced or involuntary, it is not enforceable. 8 Involuntariness is
equivalent to illegitimate "advantage-taking" by the other party. Ille-
gitimate "advantage-taking" can take such forms as physical coercion,
deliberate misrepresentation, and deliberate nondisclosure. Libertari-
ans must develop a principle to distinguish between legitimate "advan-
tage-taking" in a voluntary exchange and illegitimate "advantage-
taking" which results in an involuntary contract.9
According to Kronman, libertarians would initially attempt to use
the "liberty principle," which provides that "advantage-taking" by one
party to an agreement should be allowed unless it infringes the rights or
liberty of the other party. Kronman correctly notes that the liberty
principle is useless unless one can determine what rights people have;
an "advantage-taking" can just as easily be a right of the "advantage-
taker" as an invasion of the rights of the "victim.'10
Kronman suggests three principles that might be used to deter-
mine which forms of "advantage-taking" do not invade the rights of
the "victim" and thus are permissible: natural superiority, utilitarian-
ism, and "paretianism."II The first principle would allow naturally su-
perior people to exploit naturally inferior individuals. This approach is
incompatible with the libertarian belief in the moral equality of indi-
viduals.12 The second principle, utilitarianism, would approve "advan-
tage-taking" if the total amount of some good such as total happiness is
7. Id. at 495-97.
8. Id at 475-78.
9. Id at 478-80.
10. Id. at 483-84.
11. Id. at 484-85.
12. Id
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increased. Utilitarianism violates the libertarian tenet that individuals
have moral boundaries that must be respected even if total welfare or
happiness is not maximized.13 In Kronman's view, only the third prin-
ciple, paretianism, is consistent with the basic ethical beliefs of
libertarians.
Therefore, if forced to choose among the foregoing three princi-
ples, the libertarian would endorse paretianism to determine what
kinds of "advantage-taking" should be permitted. Paretianism, how-
ever, can take two different forms. Kronman first describes paretian-
ism as a test applied to the individual "victim" of a transaction.
"Advantage-taking" in an individual transaction would be allowed
only if the specific individual who is disadvantaged will benefit in the
long run from allowing that type of "advantage-taking." 14 This Com-
mentary will refer to this principle as Individual Paretianism (IP).
Because the highly individualized assessments called for by IP
would be impossible for courts and legislatures, and because IP would
lack the predictability of more formal, less individualistic rules,
Kronman expressly rejects IP in favor of a second version of paretian-
ism. This version allows a particular form of "advantage-taking" when
doing so will increase the long-run welfare of most people who are
taken advantage of in that particular way.15 For example, allowing
land-buyers to take advantage of deliberately acquired geological in-
formation without disclosure to the sellers may encourage mineral ex-
ploration and thereby lower mineral and overall prices enough to make
the land-sellers better off in the long run.16 This Commentary will re-
fer to this as Group Paretianism (GP), because the principle applies to
multiple, rather than individual, "victims."
GP measures the welfare of the "victims" against the baseline of
legal prohibition of the "advantage-taking." This baseline is a situa-
tion of equality17 in which either the advantage must be shared with
everyone' 8 or everyone is uniformly denied use of the advantage.' 9 In
13. Id at 485-86.
14. Id at 486.
15. Id at 487.
16. Id at 489-90. See infra text accompanying note 51.
17. Kronman, supra note 1, at 491-92.
18. Kronman uses the example of transactions based on nonpublic information. Under
one possible rule, the information-possessor is given a property right in the information and
can use it without disclosure to the party on the other side of the contract. The opposite rule
would treat the information as a public asset that the possessor cannot exploit without prior
disclosure to the other transacting party. Under GP, possessors are allowed to exploit non-
public information only if those to whom the information is not disclosed will be even better
off than they would have been had the information been regarded as a public asset. I4 at
492.
19. Kronman's illustration is the use of superior physical strength to coerce exchanges.
The baseline of equality is achieved not by forcing the strong person to share the advantage
November 1982] COMMENTARY
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Kronman's view, the possessor of an advantage may only use it if those
not possessing it are made better off by its use than "they would be if
no one were given a greater right to the advantage than anyone else." 20
This paretian prohibition applies to all talents and assets, includ-
ing strength, intelligence, wealth, and information. All belong to "a
common pool or fund in which no one-not even the person who pos-
sesses the advantage-has any prior claim." 21 If possession alone could
justify "advantage-taking," all "advantage-taking" would be justified.22
Some "advantage-taking"--coercion, for example-is clearly unjusti-
fied. The distinction between justified and unjustified "advantage-tak-
ing" by the possessor of an advantage must be based on some principle;
Professor Kronman argues that the only meaningful principle for a lib-
ertarian is paretianism. 2 3 Thus, Kronman concludes that libertarians
must use paretianism to judge the validity of any contract in which one
party takes advantage of talent or wealth. If the "advantage-taking" is
nonparetian, the "victim" can rescind.
Libertarians Must Accept Contract Rules Designed to Redistribute Wealth
More Fairly
Kronman next argues that if a libertarian uses a principle of dis-
tributive justice to judge the voluntariness of exchanges, consistency
forces him to use a principle of distributive justice to develop contract
rules that redistribute wealth.2 4 To elaborate, society uses one set of
laws to determine whether a contract is invalid because of illegitimate
"advantage-taking" (coercion and deceit). To redistribute wealth, the
society may adopt a second set of rules to govern the content of con-
tracts, such as the law of usury, minimum wages, and nondisclaimable
warranties. Both sets of contract laws are designed to limit "advan-
tage-taking." According to Kronman, because a libertarian must em-
ploy a principle of distributive justice in drafting the first set of rules
(rescindability based on illegitimate "advantage-taking"), the liberta-
rian must accept laws in the second set that redistribute wealth more
fairly. It would be arbitrary, argues Kronman, for a libertarian to limit
with others but by denying everyone the right to use strength in this particular way. GP
allows a departure from this baseline only if the weak are made better off in the long run by
being forced into contracts by the strong. Id
20. Id at 493.
21. Id
22. Id at 493-94.
23. Id at 496-97. Kronman also argues that no difference exists between taking advan-
tage of superior information or strength and taking advantage of wealth. Wealth is just
another transactional advantage and, like all transactional advantages, may be utilized only
if paretian principles permit. Id
24. Id at 495.
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"advantage-taking" in one context and not the other.25
In summary, beginning with the premise that a libertarian en-
dorses voluntary exchanges and prohibits involuntary ones, Kronman
arrives at the surprising and implausible conclusion that a libertarian
must use paretian principles to restrain the use of talent and wealth in
exchanges and must favor using contract rules to redistribute wealth
from rich to poor.
Weak Links in Kronman's Argunrent
Krounan's Argument Is Negative
Kronman correctly argues that a libertarian would allow contract
rescission by victims of certain kinds of "advantage-taking" such as co-
ercion and deceit. Nondisclosure, mutual mistake of fact, and unilat-
eral mistake of fact would pose more difficulty. The libertarian would
have to adopt some principle to decide what kind of "advantage-tak-
ing" is unjustified. Kronman's argument that libertarians would
choose paretianism is essentially negative. He describes just four possi-
ble approaches to judging "advantage-taking." Kronman rightly con-
cludes that the first, the "liberty principle," begs the question. As to the
remaining three, natural superiority, utilitarianism, and paretianism,
Kronman says that "if a libertarian were required to choose among the
three, the only one that he could choose without abandoning his most
fundamental moral beliefs would be the third."26
Kronman does not demonstrate why the libertarian would not
choose one or more other principles to limit "advantage-taking." After
discussing Kronman's paretianism, one commentator has suggested
that an alternative approach would be a plurality of moral principles
that might have a different relevance in different circumstances. 27
For example, a libertarian might divide all "advantage-taking"
contracts into two sets: (1) those in which the "victims" were subject to
no physical coercion and had the benefit of full disclosure of all rele-
vant information, and (2) all other "advantage-taking" contracts. The
libertarian might enforce all contracts in the first set, and use some sys-
tem of moral principles to determine when to enforce contracts in the
second set. For example, such a moral system might dictate that reck-
less fraud is grounds for rescission, but negligent fraud is not.
The most important reason that a libertarian would reject pare-
tianism, however, is that he or she would be offended by its premises
and inherent arbitrariness of application. The libertarian would reject
25. Id at 495-97.
26. Id at 485 (emphasis added).
27. Baker, Starting Points in Economic Alnaysis of Law, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 939, 970
(1980).
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paretianism's baseline of prohibition of all "advantage-taking." Fur-
ther, the libertarian would regard group paretianism as morally arbi-
trary because it provides for a simple majority count of whether a
group of "victims" is better off, and because defining the relevant group
of "victims" is impossible.
Kronman's Baseline Prohibiting All "Advantage-taking" Is Unjustified
Kronman's paretianism differs from classic Pareto optimality, in
which all changes that have been made make at least one person better
off and no one worse off.2 8 One can hardly object to such changes, but
virtually all policy decisions harm someone.29 The economist Kenneth
Boulding once jokingly remarked that microeconomists are a bit sim-
ple-minded; only a fool would devote a discipline to trying to make
people better off without making anyone worse off.30
Classic Pareto optimality is of no assistance in evaluating "advan-
tage-taking," because any prohibition that makes the "victim" better
off must necessarily leave the "advantage-taker" worse off. For exam-
ple, a rule prohibiting lying will make dishonest people worse off.
Neither the adoption nor the rejection of a law against lying would be
Pareto optimal.
Instead of classic Pareto optimality, Kronman advances a one-
sided paretianism. He would permit so-called "advantage-taking" if it
works to the long-run benefit of those disadvantaged by it. Without
explanation, he ignores the welfare of the potential "advantage-
takers.",3'
In light of Kronman's definition of "advantage-taking," the one-
sidedness of his paretianism is puzzling. To avoid criticism of his prin-
ciple as question-begging, Kronman emphasizes that he uses the term
"advantage-taking" in a nonpejorative fashion:
I mean the term ["advantage-taking"] to be understood in a broader
sense ... as including even those methods of gain the law allows
and morality accepts (or perhaps even approves). In this broad
28. See R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 54-55, 88 (1981): "A change is said to
be Pareto superior if it makes at least one person better off and no one worse off." Id at 54;
Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange andAuction: Philosophic Aspects of the Economic Approach to
Law, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 221, 226 (1980) ("An allocation of resources is Pareto superior to an
alternative allocation if and only if no person is disadvantaged by it and the lot of at least
one person is improved."); Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HoF-
STRA L. REV. 509, 512-13 (1981); Sager, Pareto Superiority, Consent, and Justice, 8 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 913, 914 (1980) cf. P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 435 n.12, 591 & n.3 (11th ed. 1980);
(defining an equilibrium as "Pareto optimal" if there is no possible movement from it that
could make everyone better off).
29. See R. POSNER, supra note 28, at 89 ("[Tlhe Pareto-superiority criterion is inappli-
cable to most policy questions ....").
30. Speech by Kenneth Boulding, Amherst College (1966).
31. This conclusion was independently arrived at by Baker, supra note 27, at 970.
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sense, there is advantage-taking in every contractual exchange. In-
deed, in mutually advantageous exchanges, there is advantage-taking
by both parties.32
Because Kronman defines "advantage-taking" neutrally, he can-
not assume that libertarians would agree to an absolute prohibition of
any "advantage-taking" transaction that does not leave the "victims"
better off. Because a libertarian is concerned about the victims of some
"advantage-taking" does not mean that he or she will show the same
solicitude for the "victims" of all "advantage-taking."
The libertarian antipathy toward "involuntary" exchanges is based
on the belief that individuals have the right to private property33 and
should not be deprived of it without "consent." 34 Kronman's paretian-
ism, however, requires that all assets be considered part of a "common
pool or fund in which no one-not even the person who possesses the
advantage-has any prior claim."'35
Whether a property-owner is entitled to his or her property in the
first place is a question separate from the "voluntariness" or legitimacy
of exchanges. Indeed, discussions of "voluntariness" and even of con-
tracts and exchanges presuppose the existence of private property. If
before selling my blood to you, I falsely state that it is a rare type, you
may be able to rescind. Clouds on my title to my own blood are irrele-
vant to the fraud issue. If I do not own my own blood, I cannot sell it
at all, fraudulently or otherwise.
Admittedly, libertarians must use some system of moral principles
to decide which "advantage-taking" exchanges to restrain.36 Neverthe-
less, any resulting restriction on talents or resulting redistribution of
wealth would be an incidental by-product of allowing the "victim" to
extricate himself or herself from the contract. Kronman erroneously
suggests that restrictions on robbery and deceit are equivalent to re-
straints on the talents of strength and intelligence. 37 If this were true,
society would permit robbery by the weak and fraud by the stupid. A
robber may be no stronger or cleverer than the victim but may use the
element of surprise or the threat of a weapon. The robber is distin-
guished by his willingness to rob, not by his superior talent. Similarly, a
deceitful seller may be distinguished by a willingness to lie rather than
by superior intelligence. Furthermore, if a robber or defrauder hap-
32. Kronman, supra note 1, at 480. Kronman continues with this example: "Suppose I
have a cow you want, and you have a horse I want, and we agree to exchange our animals.
The fact that you want my cow gives me an advantage I can exploit by insisting you give me
your horse in return." Id
33. R. NozIcK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 150-53, 160-64, 174-82 (1974).
34. Cf. id at 33-34 (1974) (prohibition of aggression by one person against another).
35. Kronman, supra note 1, at 493.
36. See supra text accompanying note 27.
37. See Kronman, supra note 1, at 492, 494.
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pens to be exceptionally strong or intelligent, society consistently could
permit him or her to use his or her talents in morally acceptable activi-
ties, but not in morally unacceptable ones.
Kronman correctly notes that restrictions on illegitimate "advan-
tage-taking" in contracts decrease the "advantage-taker's" wealth.38
The purpose of the restraint, however, is not wealth redistribution. Al-
lowing one party to rescind a contract deprives the other party of the
benefit of the bargain. This result is more accurately described as a
restoration of the pre-exchange wealth distribution than as a redistribu-
tion. Whether the "advantage-taker" is rich or poor, he is deprived of
the fruits of his morally offensive conduct. Whether the "victim" is
affluent or improverished, the property he gave up "involuntarily" is
returned.
Kronman's unjustified bias against "advantage-taking" is espe-
cially apparent in his initially advanced one-sided individual paretian-
ism, IP; in each contract, the "victim" may rescind, unless allowing the
"advantage-taking" works to the long-term benefit of that particular
"victim." 39 IP is either unjustified or trivial. If the "advantage-taking"
is not objectionable, the victim should not be allowed to rescind at all.
If IP is applied only to objectionable "advantage-taking," the principle
is reduced to the trivial proposition that a victim of objectionable "ad-
vantage-taking" may rescind, unless consistently allowing this type of
"advantage-taking" works to the long-term benefit of that particular
victim. IP hardly furnishes assistance in answering the crucial question
of what "advantage-taking" is objectionable. A hypothetical will make
this clear.
Suppose I buy a newly built skyscraper in San Francisco. Earth-
quake insurance is not available. A major earthquake destroys the
building one week later. Assume the following alternative facts:
1. The U.S. Geological Survey had publicly predicted a major earth-
quake in the next decade. I knew of this prediction but dismissed it.
No one knew the quake was imminent.
2. My seller had received nonpublic information from a University of
California geology professor that a quake was imminent. I had no such
information.
3. The U.S. Geological Survey knew that a quake was imminent but
did not disclose the information to avoid panic. My seller had bribed a
government official to obtain this information.
4. When I expressed concern about earthquakes, the seller gave me a
U.S. Geological Survey Report that indicated the probability of a ma-
jor earthquake in San Francisco. The actual report said that the
38. Id at 496.
39. See supra note 14 & accompanying text.
[Vol. 34
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probability was one in fifty, but the seller fraudulently altered the re-
port to read one in fifty thousand.
In all four cases, the exchange is adverse to me. I would have been
better off had I not purchased. I also would be better off if I could
rescind. Because Kronman uses the term "advantage-taking" in a
nonpejorative sense, all four cases are characterized by various types of
"advantage-taking" by the seller. If nothing else, the seller is taking
"advantage" of my desire for a skyscraper.40 In all four cases, I would
be better off in the long run with a rule allowing buyers in my position
to rescind. Uninsurable natural disasters are sufficiently rare that it is
unlikely that I would eventually sell real estate to someone who wished
to rescind because of an earthquake or other uninsurable natural disas-
ter. Therefore, Kronman's IP would allow me to rescind in all four
cases.
Common sense indicates I should not be allowed to rescind in the
first fact situation above. Whether IP should be applied to fact situa-
tions two, three, and four depends on whether the conduct of the seller
is considered sufficiently offensive to allow the buyer to rescind. In
other words, Kronman's one-sided IP should be applied only where the
"advantage-taking" is highly offensive. In that situation, the victim
should be allowed to rescind unless he or she would be better off in the
long run with a rule denying rescission. IP does not determine whether
the conduct in the fact situations two, three, and four is sufficiently
offensive. This hypothetical illustrates why a libertarian would reject
IP as useless in judging whether a certain form of "advantage-taking"
is objectionable.
IP is especially inappropriate in mutually advantageous exchanges
involving full disclosure of all material facts and no physical coercion.
Kronman gives as two examples of "advantage-taking" "a monopoly of
some scarce resource-the only water hole or the best cow or the
strongest shoulders in town. . .," and the "incapacity of the promisor
himself-[including] . . . impecuniousness. ' 41 These two examples
differ fundamentally from Kronman's other examples of "advantage-
taking": hypnotism, physical coercion, fraud, nondisclosure, and uni-
lateral mistake.42 The victim of monopoly or poverty would not be
worse off had he never met the alleged "advantage-taker." The ex-
change is mutually advantageous. Conceivably, the "victim" could
claim that if the universe were different, he would not engage in this
transaction. If the universe were different, however, the "victim"
40. See supra note 32 & accompanying text.
41. Kronman, supra note 1, at 479.
42. Id. at 477-79.
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would be a different person, with different abilities and personality. 43
In this universe, the "victim" is still better off transacting with the "ad-
vantage-taker" than not transacting at all. A libertarian would not pro-
hibit such exchanges or allow their rescission. Indeed, prohibition
would make the "victim" worse off by depriving him or her of the op-
portunity to enter a mutually beneficial exchange. Allowing rescission
would be futile because the exchanges almost never would be re-
scinded. If one person has a monopoly of a scarce resource, those who
need the resource would rather pay high prices than do without the
resource.
In order to justify differences in wealth, the noted libertarian phi-
losopher, Robert Nozick, hypothesizes that Wilt Chamberlain's con-
tract provides that each person attending his basketball games must
pay an extra twenty-five cents into a box whose contents will be paid
directly to Wilt Chamberlain. At the end of a season he winds up with
$250,000.44
Under Kronman's paretianism, Chamberlain's talent would be
thrown into a common pool to which he had no prior right. In each
exchange, he would be prohibited from using his talent, unless permit-
ting use of the talent inured to the long-run benefit of the "victim," one
of his fans. Presumably, all the fans would be desolate if Chamberlain
could not take "advantage" of them. Therefore, IP would validate all
the ticket sales.
Nozick's approach to the hypothetical is completely different,
however. He would not dream of classifying the ticket purchases as
"involuntary." Indeed, he views the transactions as paradigms of just
exchanges, which require no defense.45
In summary, paretianism's baseline of absolute prohibition of all
"advantage-taking" is much too broad-sweeping for libertarians. In
choosing a principle to judge "advantage-taking," libertarians would
reject IP and choose some other principle or system of principles. By
rejecting IP, the libertarians would escape Kronman's slippery slope at
an early stage.
The Arbitrariness of Group Paretianism
Assuming arguendo that a libertarian accepted IP as the proper
principle for judging "advantage-taking," however, the libertarian
would still reject Kronman's one-sided group paretianism (GP), which
permits a type of "advantage-taking" if, in the long run, the welfare of
43. See generally Levin, Reverse Discrimination, Shackled Runners, and Personal Iden-
tity, 37 PHIL. STUD. 139 (1980).
44. R. NOZICK, supra note 33, at 161-62.
45. See id
[Vol. 34
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most of its victims is increased.46 As mentioned earlier, convenience
and predictability prompted Kronman to substitute GP for IP.4 7 For
several reasons, the libertarian would find GP hopelessly arbitrary.
The Arbitrariness of a Simple Majority Census of Better-Off "Victims"
Kronman describes certain differences between GP and utilitari-
anism. 48 However, both principles violate the libertarian tenet that in-
dividuals have moral boundaries that must be respected even if the
total welfare of some group is not maximized.49 If a libertarian feels
that an individual's rights have been violated by a certain form of "ad-
vantage-taking," and that permitting this "advantage-taking" will not
benefit the individual "victim," the libertarian will hardly classify the
transaction as "voluntary" or acceptable solely because others in the
class of "victims" will be benefited in the long term by allowing that
type of "advantage-taking."
Under GP, if allowing a particular form of "advantage-taking"
benefits, in the long term, 51% of the disadvantaged class, the remain-
ing 49% may be sacrificed, no matter how little the 51% gain, no matter
how much the 49% lose, and no matter how much members of society
outside the class of transactors are harmed by allowing the "advantage-
taking." Conversely, under GP, if allowing a particular form of "ad-
vantage-taking" benefits in the long term only 49% of the disadvan-
taged class, the remaining 51% must be relieved of the disadvantage, no
matter how much the 49% ultimately lose, no matter how little the 51%
ultimately gain, and no matter how much members of society outside
the class of transactors are harmed by disallowing the "advantage-
taking."
This approach would please neither the utilitarian nor the liberta-
rian. The utilitarian would object because society's total welfare is not
maximized. The libertarian would be bothered because certain indi-
viduals would have their rights infringed so that others would benefit.
This analysis of GP disregards the fundamental flaw of both GP
and IP mentioned earlier;50 because Kronman's concept of "advantage-
taking" includes both objectionable and nonobjectionable conduct, no
reason exists to favor the disadvantaged "victims" over the "advantage-
takers." It is difficult to understand why anyone, much less a liberta-
rian, would embrace GP's solicitude toward the class of "disadvan-
taged" people and GP's simple majority poll of the preferences of that
class.
46. See supra note 15 & accompanying text.
47. I.
48. Kronman, supra note 1, at 487-88.
49. See supra note 13 & accompanying text.
50. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
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Impossibility of Defining the Relevant Group of Victims
GP is morally arbitrary for another reason. The number of people
who are "victims" of a certain type of "advantage-taking" depends on
how that type of "advantage-taking" is defined. Suppose that one hun-
dred people would sometimes be the "victims" of a certain type of "ad-
vantage-taking." If that type of "advantage-taking" were defined more
broadly, however, perhaps two hundred people would be "victims." If
the form of "advantage-taking" were defined more narrowly, perhaps
only fifty individuals would be "victims." These changes in the
number of "victims" might influence the result of the GP welfare poll.
For example, a majority of the two hundred "victims" might be worse
off if the "advantage-taking" were permitted, but a majority of the fifty
"victims" might be better off.
The problem of defining specific types of "advantage-taking"
plagues one of Kronman's own examples of the application of pare-
tianism. B, a trained geologist, buys a piece of property without dis-
closing to the seller, A, that there is a rich mineral deposit on the
land.51 Kronman suggests that allowing buyers to take advantage of
deliberately acquired geological information may encourage mineral
exploration and thereby lower mineral and overall prices enough to
make sellers like A better off in the long run. If so, buyers like B
should not be required to disclose. However, Kronman does not ex-
plain why the class of "victims" should not be broader or narrower
than "land-sellers whose buyers do not disclose mineral deposits."
Suppose that the sellers of land with oil, natural gas, and bauxite
are better off in the long run; but sellers of land with iron ore, uranium,
gold, and silver are worse off in the long run. Separate contract rules
could be developed for each type of mineral. Sellers could also be clas-
sified by region or state. Suppose that Oregon residents who unknow-
ingly sell natural gas-rich land are worse off in the long run because
natural gas is not an important source of power in that state. If the
buyer knows there is natural gas on an Oregon resident's property,
should the buyer be obligated to disclose this fact to the seller? Even if
one rule is to be adopted for all "minerals," "mineral" must be defined.
Is hot underground water, usable for thermal power, a mineral?
The relevant class could also be broadened to include:
1. land-sellers whose buyers do not disclose material information;
2. sellers and buyers of land when the other party does not disclose
material information;
3. sellers (of anything) whose buyers do not disclose material
information;
51. Kronman, supra note 1, at 489-90.
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4. sellers and buyers (of anything) when the other party does not dis-
close material information;
5. sellers and buyers (of anything) when the other party engages in
material nondisclosure or affirmative misrepresentation.
GP has no standard for determining whether a class of "victims"
has been properly defined. Therefore, the principle is impossible to
apply in practice.
Other Obstacles to the Application of GP
Other practical problems confront GP. Clairvoyance is required
to apply GP to Kronman's proposed rule permitting land-buyers to
conceal deliberately acquired geological information. He hypothesizes
that such a rule would make land-sellers better off in the long run be-
cause of the resulting decline in the price of a given mineral, or of min-
erals in general. To test this hypothesis, future victims must somehow
be identified and their annual land-sale losses predicted. Then, the ef-
fect of lower mineral prices on their welfare must be projected year by
year. After these two determinations, welfare gains and losses for dif-
ferent years must be aggregated using an appropriate discount rate.52
Furthermore, Kronman's nondisclosure rule might have a diver-
gent effect on classes of land-selling victims from different years. Every
year, the victims differ. Like any consumer, each victim purchases his
or her own distinctive "market basket" of goods and services. (This
distinctive "basket" also varies from year to year.) Therefore, the price
of any given mineral, or of minerals in general, has a different impact
on each annual group of land-selling victims. Were Kronman's non-
disclosure rule adopted, a majority of one year's class of victims might
be better off in the long run, but a majority of next year's victims might
be worse off.
Another problem is how to count the number of persons who are
better off and worse off. If a partnership, corporation, trust, or pension
fund is a victim, do all the partners, shareholders, and beneficiaries
each count as one victim?
Finally, who would engage in the fact-finding necessary to deter-
mine whether victims are better or worse off in the long run? As
Kronman himself suggests, courts are ill equipped to make such find-
ings.53 A legislature would be besieged by lobbyists of trade associa-
52. For a discussion on discounting future returns to present value, see V. BRUDNEY &
M. CHIRELSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE 35-44, 59-81 (2d ed.
1979); W. KLEIN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCI-
PLES 203-20 (1981).
53. Cf. Kronman, supra note 1, at 487: "Unlike a court, a legislature must evaluate the
effects of proposed rules on classes of persons rather than on particular, identifiable
individuals."
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tions arguing for certain findings and classifications. This hardly seems
a system that a libertarian would embrace.
In summary, GP is impossible to apply in practice. Even if the
relevant class of victims somehow could be defined, clairvoyance
would be necessary to identify future victims and the effect of a rule on
their long-term welfare. Furthermore, a rule may have divergent ef-
fects on the groups of victims from different years. Because of these
and other serious practical obstacles, even if a libertarian could disre-
gard the moral arbitrariness of GP, he or she would still be unable to
apply the principle.
Conclusion
Starting with the correct premise that libertarians would prohibit
certain forms of "advantage-taking"--coercion and deceit, for exam-
ple-Kronman attempts to force libertarians down the slippery slope to
wealth redistribution. Essential to Kronman's argument is libertarian
endorsement of paretianism, a principle of distributive justice that
places all advantageous assets into a common pool to which no one, not
even the possessor, has any prior claim. Paretianism has a baseline
prohibiting all "advantage-taking," even that which is morally ap-
proved. If you like my voice and pay to hear my singing, by
Kronman's definition, I am taking "advantage" of your taste for my
talent. Paretianism's common pool principle sweeps too broadly for
the libertarian. The libertarian antipathy toward robbery is based on
solicitude for, not rejection of, private property. Just because libertari-
ans would prohibit some "advantage-taking" does not mean that they
would accept a principle initially prohibiting all "advantage-taking."
Instead of using paretianism to identify illegitimate "advantage-tak-
ing," libertarians would use a set of moral principles sensitive enough
to make such differentiations as that between intentional and reckless
deceit or between affirmative misrepresentation and nondisclosure.
Paretianism's Draconian approach is of little use in making these fine
distinctions.
Kronman advances two versions of paretianism: Individual and
Group. He substitutes the latter for the former because of convenience
and predictability. GP's simple majority census of better-off "victims"
violates the libertarian tenet that individuals have moral boundaries
that must be respected although others are deprived of a benefit. In
addition, GP cannot be applied because defining the relevant class of
"victims" is impossible.
In short, a libertarian would reject paretianism as a restraint on
"advantage-taking" exchanges. Therefore, consistency would not force
him or her to use paretianism, or another principle of distributive jus-
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tice, to limit "advantage-taking" in other contexts. At an early stage,
the libertarian would escape Kronman's slippery slope to welfare state
liberalism.
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